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I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit began as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights and state tort action brought 
on behalf of the Estate of Bradley Mumoe by his personal representative Rita Hoagland, (the 
"Estate") and by Rita Hoagland individually as the mother of Bradley Mumoe ("Hoagland") 
against various Ada County employees (the "Defendants"). While the theories and even the 
named defendants changed significantly through the course of the litigation, the claims all arose 
from the suicide of Bradley Mumoe ("Mumoe") on September 29, 2008, while he was 
incarcerated at the Ada County Jail (the "Jail"). 
A. Procedural History. 
The applicable procedural history is set forth in Section LA of the Respondents' Brief 
filed herewith. Respondents' Brief, pp. 1-3. 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
The applicable facts are set forth in Section I.B. of the Respondents' Brief filed herewith. 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 4-11. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 1 
A. Did the District Court Err by Allowing Hoagland to Bring a 42 U.S.c. § 1983 Action 
for the Death of her Adult Child? 
B. Did the District Court Err by Not Suspending/Staying Discovery When Qualified 
Immunity Was Raised by the Defendants in the 42 U.S.c. § 1983 Action? 
C. Did the District Court Err by Allowing Hoagland to Seek Punitive Damages? 
1 To the extent the Court upholds the District Court's dismissal, Defendants acknowledge certain 
cross-appeal issues may be rendered moot. 
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D. Did the District Court Err by Disallowing Attorney Fees to the Prevailing 
Defendants? 
E. Did the District Court Err by Admitting and Considering Evidence and Documents 
From Hoagland Which Lacked Proper Foundation and/or Were Not Admissible 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and/or the Idaho Rules of Evidence? 
F. Are the Defendants Entitled to Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Should Defendants prevail on cross-appeal, they request costs and attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, and/or Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Did the District Court Err by Allowing Hoagland to Bring a 42 U.S.c. § 1983 Action 
for the Death of her Adult Child? 
1. Munroe Was an Adult. 
Munroe was a 19-year-old adult when he took his life in the Jail. At the time of his 
death, Munroe was homeless and it had been some time since he had resided with Hoagland. 
May 28, 2010 Dickinson Aff., ~ 5; Exs. A, B (pending augmentation); R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt 
Aff. Ex. A, pp. 5-9). Munroe was in and out of youth correctional facilities from 2002-2006, 
dropped out of high school his senior year, lived with a fiance, and was homeless. Id. 
2. Hoagland Elected to Pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim. 
While Hoagland's First Complaint pled a state statutory Wrongful Death action, she 
dismissed and abandoned that cause of action electing to pursue only a § 1983 action. R. 1451-
1540; see also Tr. 7/8110 Hearing (68:20-25, 69:1-23). Thereafter, her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit 
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on behalf of Munroe' s Estate was properly dismissed by the District Court, since Idaho precludes 
an estate from being a viable § 1983 plaintiff. Nonetheless, the District Court allowed 
Hoagland's personal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit to continue. Defendants appeal from that District 
Court determination, forwarding the nearly universal preclusion of parents as § 1983 plaintiffs 
for the unintentional loss of an adult child. 
3. Standard of Review. 
The Standard of Review for Issues A-C herein is set out in Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero. On these Issues, "[t]his Court exercises free review over a 
district court's conclusions of law. Hence, this Court may substitute its view for that of the 
district court on the issues of law presented by this appeal." Maresh, 132 Idaho 221, 224; 970 
P.2d 14, 17 (1998) (citations omitted). 
4. Creation and Retraction of Parental § 1983 Cause of Action in the Seventh Circuit. 
Contrary to other federal circuits' interpretations of § 1983 actions for the death of an 
adult child, in 1984 the Seventh Circuit initially recognized a § 1983 cause of action for the 
incidental loss of society and companionship resulting from the death of an adult child. That 
case, Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (ih Cir. 1984), involved the fatal shooting of a 
23-year-old by a police officer during a chase. The Seventh Circuit allowed the father of the 
shooting victim to recover under § 1983 for the violation of the father's substantive due process 
right to associate with his adult son. Twenty-one years later, with new U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, and the declination of other circuits to follow suit, the window was closed by the same 
court. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005), found the Seventh Circuit faced with a 
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scenano where another son was killed, this time a 22-year-old student at Northwestern 
University, fatally shot by a Chicago police officer. In Russ, the Seventh Circuit overruled Bell, 
stating: 
Since Bell, several of our sister circuits have considered whether the Constitution 
protects a parent's relationship with his adult children in the context of state 
action which has the incidental effect of severing the relationship. No other court 
of which we are aware has allowed a parent to recover for the loss of his 
relationship with his child in these circumstances. Most courts that have 
considered the issue have expressly declined to find a violation of the familial 
liberty interest where the state action at issue was not aimed at specifically 
interfering with the relationship. 
Russ, 414 F.3d at 787.2 
Affording plaintiffs a constitutional due process right to recover against the state 
in these circumstances would create the risk of constitutionalizing all torts against 
individuals who happen to have families. 
Id. at 790. 
We therefore overrule our decision in Bell insofar as it recognized a constitutional 
right to recover for the loss of companionship of an adult child when that 
relationship is terminated as an incidental result of state action. 3 
Id. at 791. 
In Russ, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the cause of action III greater detail and 
acknowledged that claims for an adult child's death had been rejected by its sister courts (the 1 st, 
2 Citing Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10lh Cir. 1985); Valdivieso 
Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1 sl Cir. 1986); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 830 (3 rd Cir. 
2003); Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357-58 (6th Cir. 2000); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 FJd 
791,804-05 (4th Cir. 1994). 
3 The term "incidental" is used because the plaintiffs had not alleged that the police officer shot 
Russ for the specific purpose of terminating Russ' relationship with his family. Id. at 790. 
Similarly, Hoagland has not alleged (and has no basis to allege) that Munroe's death was the 
result of specific intent by any Defendant to terminate Hoagland's relationship with Munroe. 
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3rd, 4th, 6th , and lOth Circuits) and would likely be disfavored by the U.S. Supreme Court.4 The 
Seventh Circuit then reversed Bell, precluding the type of claim brought by Hoagland in the 
current action. 
Additionally, in 2007, a Second Circuit district court explained: 
Whether a parent or sibling of an adult child can recover pursuant to § 1983 on 
the principle of interference with familial relations when the state action in 
question was not intended to interfere with the family relationship is a question of 
first impression in this circuit. A review of other circuits' holdings demonstrates 
that all circuits, save the Ninth Circuit, have ruled against permitting recovery for 
unintentional interference with an adult plaintiffs right to intimate association 
with an adult family member. See Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 
2005) (reversing earlier circuit precedent and finding that no other circuit has 
allowed recovery under these circumstances); see also McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 
F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2003); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 656 
(D.D.C. 2001); Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357-58 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1994); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 
807 F.2d 6,9 (Ist Cir. 1986); Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 
4 The Seventh Circuit noted: 
The Supreme Court has "always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open ended." . .. The Court has cautioned 
that we must "exercise the utmost care" in extending constitutional protection to 
an asserted right or liberty interest because, in doing so, we "place the matter 
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action." 
Id. at 789 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, in deference to Hoagland it should be noted that one 
circuit, the Ninth, might allow her to bring this type of claim. This anomaly was noted by the 
Seventh Circuit, but it did not dissuade that Circuit from rejecting the § 1983 parental cause of 
action. Id. at 788. Furthermore, at least one of the Ninth Circuit's own federal district courts has 
noted that the Ninth Circuit is alone in this regard and criticized the Circuit for its position: 
The development of Ninth Circuit precedent that parents are entitled to bring a 
companionship claim in the context of an adult child where the deprivation was 
incidental to the state action has, to say the least, not come about directly and 
explicitly, nor has it been supported by any extensive and rigorous analysis. 
Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1264 (2006). (Lamenting that though binding 
upon it, the Ninth Circuit's development of this precedent is "inadvertent and/or not particularly 
well thought out under Supreme Court precedent ... " Id. at 1265.) 
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1190 (10th Cir. 1985); but see Curnow by and through Curnow v. Ridgecrest 
Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Laureano v. Goord, WL 2826649 at * 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
Case law analyzing this § 1983 theory has not been stagnant. Courts are now moving 
towards abolishing any § 1983 familial rights theory regardless of the age of the plaintiffs or 
decedents, since the basis for all § 1983 familial death claims is identical. In Estate of Perry ex 
ref. Perry v. Boone County Sheriff, WL 694696 (S.D.Ind. 2008), a Seventh Circuit district court 
analyzed U. S. Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit case law and explained: 
Plaintiffs raise several § 1983 claims. The Minor Children contend that the Sheriff 
and Dr. Doolan deprived them of "a liberty interest in continued familial 
relations" with Perry. The Estate contends that the Sheriff and Dr. Doolan failed 
to properly train jail officers and that Dr. Doolan was deliberately indifferent to 
Perry's medical needs. The Court addresses each of these claims in tum. 
a. Interference With Familial Relations. 
Defendants contend that the interference with familial relations claim is 
foreclosed by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 791 
(7th Cir. 2005), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, which provided that no such 
claim is available in cases involving adult children. See also Thompson v. City of 
Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 452 n. 25 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that similar familial 
relations claim of victim's mother and wife was properly dismissed). Plaintiffs 
argue that the Russ court left the door open for minor children to assert such a 
claim because it explicitly recognized that the needs of minor children "warrant [ 
] 'sharply different constitutional treatment.' "Russ, 414 F.3d at 790 (quoting 
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637,656 (D.C. Cir. 2001); McCurdy v. 
Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 829 (3d Cir. 2003)). The Court concludes that the claim 
should be dismissed. 
First, it is doubtful whether a substantive claim for interference with familial 
relations even exists under § 1983. The Russ court was certainly careful not to 
explicitly recognize such a right, and this Court is unaware of any current decision 
of the Seventh Circuit recognizing such a right. In fact, at least one Circuit Court 
has rejected such an argument. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 805 (4th Cir. 
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1994). In doing so, the Shaw court noted that the Supreme Court "has never held 
that the protections of substantive due process extend to claims based on 
governmental action which affects the family relationship only incidentally." Id. 
(citations omitted). Indeed, that the Supreme Court would recognize such a right 
where the effect is merely incidental seems unlikely given that it has held that 
negligent infliction of harm is not actionable under § 1983. See Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). 
Further, where the claim has been recognized, it often arises in the context of 
circumstances implicating procedural due process, such as cases where a state 
attempts to separate a parent from a child without due process of law to protect 
the parent's liberty interests. See Russ, 414 F.3d at 786 (citing Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1243-44 (7th Cir. 1984)). Historically, the claim has 
been limited to situations where the state action is aimed at the relationship, i. e., 
where the action is deliberate. See id. at 788-89 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331); 
see also id. at 790 (collecting cases); Thompson, 472 F.3d at 452 n. 25 (noting 
that plaintiffs lacked standing to raise such a claim under § 1983 because they had 
not alleged that the victim was killed "for the specific purpose of terminating [the 
victim's] relationship with his family"). 
As the Russ court recognized, finding a constitutional violation based on official 
actions that were not aimed at the familial relationship inappropriately stretches 
due process "far beyond the guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court." 
Russ, 414 F.3d at 789-90. Here, Plaintiffs- have not presented any evidence, much 
less even alleged, that the actions of the Defendants were specifically directed at 
disrupting the familial relationship. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS both of the 
requests for summary judgment on this claim and DISMISSES the same with 
prejudice. 
Estate of Perry, 2008 WL 694696 at *11,12. 
Because Hoagland did not allege Munroe's death was the product of any Defendant's 
intent to sever her relationship with her son, under current law her action cannot survive. 
5. District Court's Analysis. 
The District Court forwarded that a Fifth Circuit case allowed Hoagland to proceed in an 
Idaho Court. The case it relied upon, Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386 (5 th Cir. 1992), 
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was decided in 1992 - before nearly every circuit foreclosed this § 1983 cause of action. Rhyne 
determined that Texas law allowed the mother of a deceased jail inmate to bring a § 1983 action 
for her injuries after her son repeatedly threatened, attempted, then committed suicide in a 
county jail. Rhyne based its analysis on the fifty-year-old Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5 th 
Cir. 1961). Brazier, in turn, was based upon Georgia'S survivability statute, and "held that 
§ 1983 incorporated Georgia's wrongful death and survival statute remedies under § 1983." 
Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 390 (emphasis added). Rhyne also quoted approvingly from GrandstajJv. 
City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5 th Cir. 1985), explaining, "we look to Texas law for guidance for 
the damages recoverable for [plaintiffs son's] death." ld. at 390-391 (emphasis added). 
Here, the District Court allowed Hoagland to utilize an extinct § 1983 theory, combining 
it with Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute. Idaho Law provides a wrongful death action because 
descendants' claims do not survive their passing in our state. It was never intended to be a 
vehicle to transform abandoned § 1983 theories into viable causes of action. 
Allowing Hoagland to proceed with her § 1983 parental claim is contrary to the 
overwhelming body of law and would place this Court in the unenviable position of adopting an 
outlying, disfavored and nearly extinct analysis that is "inadvertent and/or not particularly well 
thought out under Supreme Court precedent .... " Rentz, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (2006). 
Unlike the federal district court in Rentz, this Court is not subject to the dictates of the Ninth 
Circuit. Given the clear direction of the vast majority of the federal circuits (the First, Third, 
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia) and the U.S. Supreme Court's cautious 
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approach with regard to the expansion of substantive due process claims,s it seems prudent to 
follow the currently accepted application of substantive due process claims and overturn the 
District Court's decision to allow Hoagland's § 1983 action for the death of an adult child. 
B. Did the District Court Err by Not Suspending/Staying Discovery When Qualified 
Immunity Was Raised by the Defendants in the 42 U.S.c. § 1983 Action? 
1. Introduction. 
In light of the discovery protection afforded to defendants when issues of qualified 
immunity are at stake, in May of 2010, the Defendants moved the District Court for an order 
protecting them from further discovery pending the argument of the original summary judgment 
motion. R. pp. 66-74. At the hearing on both the protective motion and motion to continue on 
July 8, 2010, the District Court denied the request for a protective order, granting the Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Continue the Summary Judgment hearing. 6 
The Defendants appeal the District Court's decision not to stay discovery and make an 
early qualified immunity determination. 
2. Standard of Review. 
See Standard of Review in Issue A as stated above. 
5 See n. 4. 
6 August 16, 2010 Amended Order Denying Motion for Discovery Protection; Granting Motion 
for Leave to Amend; Granting Rule 56(f) Motion; Continuing Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Partially Denying Motion to Strike; and Granting Motion to Shorten Time ("August 16, 2010 
Amended Order"), added to the Record pursuant to January 31, 2012 Order Granting Motion to 
Augment; see also Tr. 7/8110 Hearing (15:4). 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF PAGE 9 
3. Discovery Protection in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Immunity Cases. 
Suspending or preventing discovery and an early immunity determination is not novel. 
The U.S. Supreme Court and federal circuits all recognize and uphold its application when a 
defendant is protected by absolute or qualified immunity. In the case at bar both absolute and 
qualified immunity were raised in the Defendants' Answer. R. p. 62. 
When a defendant raises qualified immunity, "[u]ntil [the] threshold immunity question is 
resolved, discovery should not be allowed." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982). 
And, "[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a 
defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of 
discovery." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985). 
In Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated, 
Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the defense [ of immunity] is meant to give 
government officials a right, not merely to avoid "standing trial," but also to avoid 
the burdens of "such pretrial matters as discovery ... , as '[i]nquiries of this kind 
can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government. '" 
(Citations omitted.) 
In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,598 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated: 
[I]f the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should 
resolve that threshold question before permitting discovery. To do so, the court 
must determine whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, the 
official's conduct violated clearly established law. 
(Citation omitted.) 
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Since the Defendants asserted qualified immunity, the U. S. Supreme Court instructs that 
the matter must be decided early in the proceedings so that the cost and expense of discovery and 
trial are avoided. 7 
This Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's governmental immunity position in Nation 
v. Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177,158 P.3d 953 (2007) and Rosenberger v. Kootenai County 
Sheriff's Dept., 140 Idaho 853, 103 P.3d 466 (2004). In Nation, both absolute and qualified 
immunity were pled in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort action brought against Ada County and 
the state of Idaho. Commenting on qualified immunity: 
The contours of qualified immunity are the same under both Idaho and Federal 
law; generally government officials performing discretionary functions are 
shielded from civil liability as long as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known. 
Nation, 144 Idaho at 186-187; 158 P.3d at 962-963 (citations omitted). 
In Rosenberger, this Court explained, "[i]f qualified immunity is requested in a suit 
against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, a ruling on the issue of 
qualified immunity should be made early in the proceedings so that costs and expenses of trial 
7 "The privilege is an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability .... " Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (citations omitted) (commenting on qualified immunity). 
"Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" 
Id. at 194 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985)). "[G]overnment officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages .... [P]ublic officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling 
threats of liability." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806. In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "we 
repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible 
stage in litigation." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,233 (2009) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 
U.S. 224,232 (1991) (per curiam)). 
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are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Rosenberger, 140 Idaho at 857, 103 P.3d at 470 
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2155). 
Both federal and Idaho state law recognize that because of their work, governmental 
actors are protected by immunities in cases prosecuted under § 1983 and tort theories. Immunity 
is not simply a defense - it is immunity from discovery and litigation.8 
When the Defendants sought discovery protection in this case, the District Court denied 
the request, providing no basis for its ruling. August 16,2010 Amended Order (see n. 6.) 
The Defendants appeal the District Court's decision not to grant the Defendants' motion 
for an order shielding them from further discovery obligations while the qualified immunity 
question was pending. 
C. Did the District Court Err by Allowing Hoagland to Seek Punitive Damages? 
1. Standard of Review. 
See Standard of Review as stated in Issue A above. 
8 Although qualified immunity law provides discovery protection at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation, in the interest of cooperation the Defendants had already responded to fifty (50) 
interrogatories (even though that exceeded the number of interrogatories allowed by I.R.C.P. 
33(a)), forty-five (45) requests for production, one hundred-seventy (170) requests for admission, 
eleven (11) supplemental discovery responses, and provided over four thousand (4,000) pages of 
bates stamped documents to Hoagland before moving for this protection. Tr. 7/8/1 0 Hearing 
(33:4-11). Defendants also spent considerable time and effort redacting uninvolved inmates' 
images from hours of video recordings from the Jail's VICON video camera system. Tr. 7/8/10 
Hearing (33: 12-25). 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF - PAGE 12 
2. Section 1983 Punitive Damage Law. 
The seminal § 1983 governmental punitive damages case is City of Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). In Newport, the district court jury returned a verdict 
containing a punitive damage award against the city of the same name. Newport appealed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision overturning the punitive damage award explained: 
"we hold that a municipality is [absolutely] immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983." !d. at 271. The Court explained that a punitive damage award against a government is 
essentially an award against the taxpayers: 
We see no reason to believe that Congress' opposition to punishing innocent 
taxpayers and bankrupting local governments would have been less applicable 
with regard to the novel specter of punitive damages against municipalities. 
Id. at 266. Continuing this theme, the Court expanded: 
[I]t remains true that an award of punitive damages against a municipality 
"punishes" only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. 
These damages are assessed over and above the amount necessary to compensate 
the injured party .... Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in 
effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by 
an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the 
bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited 
upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers. 
Id. at 267. 
In Idaho, this same rationale would preclude punitive damage awards in both official and 
individual § 1983 lawsuits. 
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3. Ada County and Official Capacity Defendants. 
Hoagland sought and was allowed to amend her Complaint to include a prayer for 
punitive damages against both Ada County and the individually named Defendants who were 
sued in both their official and individual capacities. Tr. 9/13/10 Hearing (144:3 - 146:6). Based 
on the unequivocal holding of the U.S. Supreme Court, Ada County is absolutely immune from a 
punitive damages claim against it or its employees sued in their "official capacities," because a § 
1983 official capacity suit is actually against the government: 
Official-capacity suits ... "generally represent only another way of pleading an 
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, n.55, 56 
L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). As long as the government entity receives notice and an 
opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, 
to be treated as a suit against the entity. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 
(1985). 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985). 
In other words, an award of punitive damages against an officer in his official capacity 
"is in reality an assessment against the county, which is immune from such damages." Mitchell 
v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). In the present case, both Ada County and the 
individually named Defendants (when sued in their official capacities) are immune from an 
award of punitive damages. 
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4. Section 1983 and Individual Capacity Defendants. 
However, the District Court allowed Hoagland to seek an award of punitive damages 
against the Defendants in their individual capacities.9 In a § 1983 action, when sued in an 
individual capacity, some states allow the sued individual to be personally liable for a punitive 
damage award, and the judgment to be executed against the employee's personal assets. See 
Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166. 
Moreover, there is available a more effective means of deterrence. By allowing 
juries and courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against 
the offending official, based on his personal financial resources, the statute 
directly advances the public's interest in preventing repeated constitutional 
deprivations. 
Newport, 453 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added). 
However, under Idaho state law, the "official capacity" or "individual" capacity 
distinction is without difference. No governmental employee, while acting within his or her 
course and scope of employment, will face paying damages from personal financial resources. 
Idaho Code § 6-903(b) requires governmental entities in Idaho to defend and indemnifY their 
employees: 
[A] governmental entity shall provide a defense to its employee, including a 
defense and indemnification against any claims brought against the employee in 
the employee's individual capacity when the claims are related to the course and 
scope of employment, and be responsible for the payment of any judgment on any 
claim or civil lawsuit against an employee for money damages .... 
Idaho Code § 6-903(b) (emphasis added). 
9 September 27, 2010 Order on Pending Motions ("September 27, 2010 Order"), added to the 
Record pursuant to January 31, 2012 Order Granting Motion to Augment. 
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Since the governmental entity is required to provide indemnification, the employee's 
personal financial resources will never be at risk and punitive damages are inapplicable. 
Because of these statutory provisions, in Idaho, a claim of punitive damages cannot be 
allowed against a county defendant named in hislher individual capacity absent an allegation the 
employee was acting outside his or her course and scope of duties. 10 
Since all litigation costs and any applicable indemnification (including an award of 
punitive damages against an indemnified employee) would be paid from Ada County tax dollars, 
a punitive damage award against its employees is ineffective when taxpayers are at risk: 
The impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and, at 
times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries, 
and therefore on services available to the public at large. Absent a compelling 
reason for approving such an award, not present here, we deem it unwise to inflict 
the risk. 
Newport, 453 U.S. at 270-271. 
In the case at bar, even the District Court understood this quandary, questioning its 
decision to allow punitive damages, explaining: 
10 There is further support for this conclusion. The Idaho Legislature retained common-law 
immunity from punitive damages. The Idaho Tort Claims Act (Idaho Code §§ 6-901, et. seq.) 
waived certain of its sovereign immunities to allow some litigation and damages against the state 
and its subdivisions. However, the Act did not waive immunity from punitive damages. In fact, 
the reservation of that immunity is blunt: "Governmental entities and their employees shall not 
be liable for punitive damages on any claim allowed under the provisions of this act." Idaho 
Code § 6-918. Noteworthy is the fact that the Newport decision gave great weight to common-
law immunities: "One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that 
members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses 
previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law 
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary." Newport, 453 U.S. at 258. 
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And having said all that, the court is still struck with the irony of asking a jury to 
award punitive damages if the facts support a finding of reckless or callous 
indifference when as a matter of fact, a jury would be entering an award with the 
specific intention of deterring a specific employee and any award would be paid 
not by the employee but by the employer in this case. 
But, I suppose we can cross that bridge when we come to it, because I'll grant the 
motion to file the third amended complaint and the motion for enlargement of 
time in the same breath. 
Tr. 9113110 Hearing (145:18-146:4); See n. 9. 
Based on the above, the Defendants ask this Court to overturn the District Court's 
decision to allow punitive damages in a § 1983 case against governmentally indemnified 
defendants. II 
II Even if this Court finds punitive damages are not precluded as a matter oflaw, the pleadings in 
this case did not rise to the level necessary for a punitive damages award. The standard set for 
the imposition of punitive damages is purposefully high: "We hold that a jury may be permitted 
to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to 
be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the 
federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
The US. Supreme Court explained the basis for this high standard: Punitive damages are 
awarded in the jury's discretion "to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to 
deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." ld. at 54. 
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), the US. Supreme Court 
defined the terms "malice" and "reckless indifference" as used in Smith v. Wade. ld. The US. 
Supreme Court stated, "Most often, however, eligibility for punitive awards is characterized in 
terms of a defendant's motive or intent. Indeed, the justification of exemplary damages lies in 
the evil intent of the defendant. Accordingly, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is 
always required." Kolstad, 125 U.S. at 538 (citations omitted). 
Hoagland did not allege "conscious wrongdoing" on the part of any defendant, nor has 
she forwarded any facts supporting a need for "deterrence and punishment." Quite the opposite, 
the evidence shows that Defendant James Johnson was deeply affected by Munroe's death, both 
personally and professionally, describing it as a "tragic occurrence" that was "pretty 
devastating." R. p. 2482 (21: 11,19) He testified that Munroe's death left him "saddened [and] 
shocked" and was "traumatic." R. p. 2482, (21:9-24); R. p. 2483 (24:4-8). Hoagland's case, at 
its core, is a disagreement with Johnson's clinical decision. Ultimately the District Court found 
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D. Did the District Court Err by Disallowing Attorney Fees to the Prevailing 
Defendants? 12 
1. Introduction. 
Since its inception in early 2009, this litigation transformed dramatically. What started as a 
two (2) plaintiff action under state tort law and § 1983 against the Jail detention staff was replaced 
by an entirely different § 1983 action against twenty-five (25) new defendants, reduced by the 
District Court to a single plaintiff § 1983 claim against one (1) social worker, and then dismissed 
completely. This was due in large part to the Defendants' continuous efforts (through numerous 
motions and other argument) to frame the issues and parties in response to Hoagland's arguments 
that were not supported in law or fact. Having had to expend considerable time and expense 
defending the same entitles the Defendants to their attorney fees. 
2. Standard of Review. 
We review a trial court's determinations regarding motions for new trial and 
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251,255, 178 P.3d 
616, 620 (2008); Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 
(2009). We assess whether the trial court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
no support to even sustain a § 1983 case, which undermines Hoagland's argument for punitive 
damages. 
12 On October 17, 2011, the District Court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Request for 
Costs. Supp. R. pp. 133-144. The Order properly awarded the Defendants discretionary costs 
and costs as a matter of right. Accordingly, the Defendants are no longer pursuing their Cross-
Appeal as to that issue. 
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it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Tex. Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 
(2004) ... Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 
(2003). 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., WL 666038 *4 (Idaho 2012). 
3. State and Federal Law. 
Though this matter was brought in state court, Hoagland's theories were based in state (at 
least at one time) then solely in federal law. As a result, both state and federal law allow the 
Defendants to recover costs and attorney fees. 
a. Idaho Law. 
I.R.C.P. 54( e)(1) allows attorney fees to be awarded to a prevailing party. Attorney fees 
may also be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 when the case was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-117 additionally allows 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses where the opposing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. See Halvorson v. N. Latah County Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196,245 P.3d 
497 (2011). This Court teaches that "[ w ]hen deciding whether the case was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken 
into account." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 13 5 Idaho 518, 524, 20 
P.3d 702, 708 (2001). 
b. Federal Law. 
The attorney fees provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is found in § 1988. The applicable 
portions of § 1988 read: 
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(b) Attorney's fees 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981 a, 1982, 
1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fees as part 
of the costs .... 
This statute not only allows a court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party, but also 
to a prevailing defendant upon the finding "that the plaintiff s action was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.,,13 Hughes 
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (citations omitted). 
Lastly, "[a plaintiffs] decision to terminate an ill conceived and wrongly prosecuted law 
suit cannot serve to limit the consequences of a course of action it initiated and persistently 
followed." Fidelity Guarantee Mortg. Corp. v. Reben, 809 F.2d 931,937 (1st Cir. 1987). In 
essence, a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of § 1983 claims does not bar recovery by a defendant. 
4. Argument. 
In light of the somewhat convoluted history of this matter, it may be best to 
chronologically discuss the individual stages of this litigation, specifying the results and basis for 
recovery by the applicable Defendants at each stage. 
a. Hoagland's First Complaint and the Defendants' First Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
On January 23, 2009, Hoagland and the Estate filed a Complaint (R. pp. 19-29) 
containing claims based on Hoagland and the Estate's allegation that the detention deputies were 
13 The Defendants do not argue that Hoagland's case was brought in subjective bad faith. 
However, and as the law provides, the Defendants believe the case as filed and pursued was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
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watching a televised football game instead of preventing Munroe from taking his life while he 
was an inmate at the Jail. The separate claim against Ms. Robertson ostensibly stemmed from a 
telephone conversation with Hoagland. 
After the July 30, 2009 acceptance of the Complaint (R. pp. 30-31), on September 11, 
2009, the Defendants provided their first discovery response, including a detailed detective's 
investigative report, demonstrating that Hoagland's allegations were factually unfounded. R. p. 
3368; see also, Tr. 7/811 0 Hearing (26: 17-25; 27-30). 
In addition to being on notice that the factual basis of her Complaint was flawed, 
Hoagland had filed § 1983 claims on behalf of an invalid party (the Estate) and was also aware 
that she had not filed a notice of tort claim (required as a condition precedent under Idaho law). 
R. p. 105; May 28,2010 Dickinson Aff., Ex 11 (pending augmentation by this Court). Further, 
the Estate failed to allege facts that could constitute a basis for Hoagland's intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim against Ms. Robertson. 14 Despite Hoagland's knowledge of these 
problems, Hoagland made no attempt to address the deficiencies of her Complaint. See Tr. 
7/8110 Hearing (17:4-25; 18-23). 
On February 2, 2010, Hoagland's counsel indicated they were considering amending 
their Complaint to add parties, but not additional counts. May 28, 2010 Dickinson Aff. at ~ 2. 
(pending augmentation); Tr. 7/8/10 Hearing (25: 5-25 ;26); R. p. 1 002, ~ 12. However, no such 
amendment was forthcoming. Id. In light of the stated § 1983 claims, early resolution of the 
14 Which was most likely attributable to the nonexistence of such facts. 
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Defendants' applicable immunity defenses was required by law. 15 As a result, in early May the 
Defendants provided Hoagland with notice of their intent to file for summary judgment. 16 
Hoagland's counsel responded, stating they intended to amend the Complaint by May 21,2010. 
R. p. 1002, ~ 12; Tr. 7/8110 Hearing (25:2-25). However, amendment was forthcoming. Given 
the impending trial date, the Defendants found themselves in an untenable position where they 
could not afford to continue waiting, and a week later moved for summary judgment on the 
existing Complaint, including the filing of a forty-one (41) page accompanying Memorandum 
and fourteen (14) supporting affidavits in support. 
Instead of addressing the majority of the arguments raised by the Defendants, Hoagland 
effectively admitted that her allegations were brought without a reasonable basis in fact and/or 
law when she abandoned each of the state law claims and dismissed all of the Defendants against 
whom the federal § 1983 claims were originally directed. 17 See R. pp. 818-875. This was, in 
essence, a complete retraction of the Complaint. 
A year and a half after filing, Hoagland forwarded she was not prepared to defend against 
summary judgment and asked the District Court to prevent the Defendants from proceeding with 
summary judgment until she spoke with her expert witness and undertook more discovery to help 
IS See earlier discussion on pp. 9-12. 
16 See the original Motion for Discovery Protection, filed May 5, 2010. R. p. 73. 
17 This includes Marshall McKinley, Michael Vineyard, Paul Reiger, Kirt Taylor, Adam Arnold, 
Kevin Manning, and Leslie Robertson. Again, Sheriff Gary Raney was not named as a 
defendant in regards to the federal § 1983 claims. See R. p. 25. 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRlEF - PAGE 22 
her determine what claims she may have. 18 Tr. 7/8110 (64:2-21). The District Court continued 
summary judgment. 19 Since Hoagland's Amended Complaint dropped the original Defendants, 
they were the prevailing party with respect to their Summary Judgment Motion, and were 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988. This is true regardless of the fact that Hoagland abandoned her claims. See Fidelity, 809 
F.2d 931 at 937. 
b. Hoagland's Three (3) Amended Complaints and the Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. 
Over the next two (2) months, Hoagland amended her First Complaint multiple times (R. 
pp. 1088-1176, 1177-1270), but waited until September 14,2010, to finally file her Third 
Amended Complaint, which was ninety (90) pages long and contained four hundred and sixty-six 
(466) paragraphs. R. pp. 1451-1540. It was a completely different Complaint from the original. 
Seven (7) of the eight (8) original Defendants were replaced with thirteen (13) new Defendants20 
and the only original Defendant remaining (Sheriff Gary Raney) was now being sued under a 
completely different theory. The basis of Hoagland's new lawsuit dramatically changed. Instead 
of being based on the alleged actions of Jail detention staff, it was now based on the alleged 
actions of Jail medical and administrative staff. The focus of the lawsuit shifted entirely from 
18 This continued the time and expense incurred by the Defendants, contrary to the U.S. Supreme 
Court's admonition that immunity cases are to be decided early in litigation to prevent 
defendants from discovery and litigation burdens. 
19 August 16, 2010 Amended Order (see n. 6). 
20 The new Defendants were listed as: Ada County; Linda Scown; Kate Pape; Steven Garrett, 
M.D.; Michael E. Estess, M.D.; Ricky Lee Steinberg; Karen Barrett; Jenny Babbitt; James 
Johnson; Jeremy Wroblewski; David Weich; Lisa Farmer; and Jamie Roach. 
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the actions of the individual detention deputies and Ms. Robertson to the medical care Munroe 
received at the Jail, along with policies and customs of the Ada County Sheriffs Office. Gone in 
their entirety were the state law claims. Instead, Hoagland now alleged only § 1983 civil rights 
claims requiring a much higher burden, and the allegations were much different from those 
alleged in the original Complaint. 
The Defendants next filed a Motion to Dismiss (pursuant to I.R.c.P. 12(b)(6» based on 
the ineligibility of Hoagland and the Estate as valid § 1983 plaintiffs under Idaho law. This 
argument was not new, as it had been brought, briefed, and argued earlier in the Defendants 
original Motion for Summary Judgment. In its November 2, 2010 Memorandum and Order (R. 
pp. 1578-1588), the District Court agreed that Idaho law precluded the Estate from bringing 
claims and dismissed Count I of the Third Amended Complaint, explaining that "Idaho law does 
not allow Munroe's estate to bring a claim." R. p. 1584. Hoagland and the Estate filed a Motion 
to Reconsider. R. pp. 1797-1805. The District Court explained its analysis, but did not alter its 
dismissal. R. pp. 2315-2356. The Defendants filed motions and memoranda twice to dismiss a 
plaintiff who brought suit with no standing.21 As such, the Defendants are entitled to attorney 
21 Unbeknownst to the District Court and the Defendants, Hoagland had also filed an identical 
lawsuit in U.S. District Court. Counsel for the Defendants discovered the federal complaint, 
captioned Hoagland v. Ada County, et al., 1 O-CV -00486-EJL, and during an oral argument on 
October 7,2010, brought the concurrent federal court filing to the District Court's attention. The 
Defendants orally moved to dismiss the state lawsuit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) which 
provides for dismissal where there is "another action pending between the same parties for the 
same cause." The District Court declined to entertain the oral motion, but said it would entertain 
a written motion. Tr. 1017/1 0 Hearing (153-155). The Defendants assumed Hoagland would 
dismiss her federal lawsuit, but the federal case continued U.S. District Court Judge, issuing a 
Litigation Order. Faced with defending the same lawsuit in different forums, the Defendants 
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fees pursuant to I.R.c.P. 54(d) and (e), Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
incurred in defending against claims filed and pursued without a reasonable basis and without 
foundation. 
c. The Defendants' Restated Motion [or Summary Judgment. 
In light of the dismissal of the Estate and the complete shift in Hoagland's underlying 
theories and culpable parties under the Third Amended Complaint, the Defendants found it 
necessary to research, brief, and collect affidavits to support a restated summary judgment 
argument tailored to the new § 1983 claims. The Defendants' Restated Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed on November 12, 2010. R. pp. 1668-1696. 
Hoagland's Third Amended Complaint can be subdivided into twenty-five (25) separate 
§ 1983 claimslDefendants. One (1) claim was made against Ada County, twelve (12) were made 
against individuals in their official capacities, and twelve (12) were made against individuals in 
their personal capacities. The Defendants repeatedly argued that pursuant to the high bar 
required to be met to pursue § 1983 actions, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate direct causal 
connections resulting in specific constitutional violations. On January 20, 2011, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to twenty-four (24) of the twenty-five (25) new Defendants. 
R. pp. 2315-2356. Only one Defendant (in his individual capacity) was left in the lawsuit. 
filed a written motion and memorandum with the District Court requesting dismissal. Only then, 
after the Defendants had expended additional resources, did Plaintiffs dismiss their duplicative 
federal case. R. pp. 2198-2200. 
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On February 7, 2011, Hoagland moved for reconsideration but, out of the twenty-four 
(24) dismissals, only asked this Court to reconsider five (5) claims/Defendants,22 essentially 
admitting nineteen (19) of the claims/Defendants in the Third Amended Complaint were 
forwarded without a reasonable basis in law or fact. R. pp. 2360-2362. The Defendants forward 
that each of the dismissed Defendants was entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys' fees 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d) and (e), Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
d. The District Court's Findings Regarding Hoagland's Discoverv 
Compliance. 
The District Court, referencing Hoagland's discovery compliance during this litigation, 
noted: "Additionally, Plaintiff s discovery production was limited. As a result, while 
undertaking their own investigation, Defendants incurred copying fees and investigator fees." 
Supp. R. p. 140. Because Hoagland's discovery responses were "limited," the Defendants were 
obliged, for case preparation purposes, to investigate and discover much information on their 
e. Conclusion. 
Distilled to its essence, both state and federal law provide that a prevailing party may be 
awarded fees when a lawsuit is brought without a reasonable basis or foundation in law and/or 
22 These appeared to consist of official capacity claims against Ada County, Sheriff Gary Raney, 
Linda Scown, Kate Pape, and an individual capacity claim against Kate Pape. 
23 See R. pp. 950, 951 (referencing Defendants' repeated attempts to obtain Hoagland's medical 
records.); See also, Tr. 12/9/10 Hearing (20-22). In a later hearing, the Defendants explained 
their inability to obtain Hoagland's medical history, Munroe's medical history and juvenile 
probation history from Hoagland. R. pp. 950-952; Tr. 9115110 Hearing (14). 
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fact. Furthermore, one must take into account the entire course of the litigation to make a 
finding. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 525, 20 P.3d at 708. 
As demonstrated by the history set forth above, many of Hoagland's claims had no basis 
in law and/or fact. Applicable law is always accessible to a party's counsel, but in some cases a 
plaintiff could assert that facts of the case were unknown to them early in the lawsuit. However, 
the Jail's criminal investigation into Munroe's death was provided to Hoagland and the Estate in 
Defendants' First Discovery Response dated September 11,2009. R. pp. 1015-1036. It was 
apparent in September 2009 that Hoagland's "television watching" allegation was without 
factual basis. And, even though she had information disproving her allegations, she waited until 
July of2010 (after the Defendants filed for summary judgment) to abandon them. 
The Defendants have prevailed more than once, obtaining a dismissal against one of two 
Plaintiffs, abandonment of all stated claims against the eight (8) original Defendants, and court-
ordered dismissals on behalf of the twenty-five (25) Defendants. This does not include the 
claims and defendants dismissed in the federal action. The Defendants prevailed largely because 
Hoagland's allegations lacked a reasonable basis in fact and/or law and were filed without 
foundation. Ada County taxpayers have expended thousands of dollars defending this matter on 
behalf of the dismissed Defendants, and are entitled to recovery of their attorney fees, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, and 42 US.c. § 1988. Based on 
the foregoing, the Defendants respectfully request this Court overturn the District Court's 
decision not to award Defendants' attorney fees. 
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E. Did the District Court Err by Admitting and Considering Evidence and Documents 
From Hoagland Which Lacked Proper Foundation and/or Were Not Admissible 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and/or the Idaho Rules of Evidence? 
1. Introduction. 
Hoagland's motion practice created an evidentiary quagmire for both the Defendants and 
the District Court. Instead of supporting her evidence with affidavits from witnesses who 
possessed personal knowledge and who could provide foundation for the evidence proffered, her 
attorney signed omnibus affidavits ("Overson Affidavits") purporting to lay foundation for 
hundreds of documents. 
A cursory review of the Overson Affidavits (R pp. 288-550, 2073-2197, 2625-2990, 
3342-3465, 3505-3782) reflects how Hoagland directs the District Court to search through 
numerous pages of attachments to find what she cites to, and her attorney attempts to lay 
foundation for almost all of her documentary submissions. 
The first Overson Affidavit purported to lay foundation for everything from Mumoe's 
psychiatric hospital records (R. p. 544) to counsel's written "impressions" of what records were 
not included in discovery, explaining: "[he had] reviewed all of the medical records .... " R. p. 
290, ~~ 17, 24; p. 291, ~~ 28, 35, 38. Further Overson Affidavits described Jail videos that 
counsel watched (R. pp. 2074-2075, ~ 7), and Hoagland attempted to offer an Overson Affidavit 
into evidence nearly two weeks after the case was dismissed. R. pp. 3505-3782. This 
inappropriate submission of evidence, and arguments based on the same, obligated the 
Defendants to object and move to strike numerous pages of improperly submitted documents. 
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The shear volume of attachments to these affidavits forced Defendants to interpose broad, 
generalized objections. The District Court was likewise confronted with the proposition of 
evidentiary rulings on pages of improperly submitted evidence. The District Court struck a 
number of Hoagland's submissions, but still allowed a number of improper submissions. 
Hoagland even cites to this Court evidence the District Court struck.24 
The Defendants were required to file six objections and motions to strike before the 
District Court. 
2. Standard of Review. 
See Standard of Review as set forth in Issue D above. 
3. Law. 
Rule 56(e), I.R.C.P. provides in pertinent part: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testifY to the matters stated therein ... 
In Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 895 P.2d 1223 (1995), Ball, the attorney 
representing Cates, authored an affidavit that was objected to. This Court agreed that the 
information forwarded in conjunction with Ball's affidavit was improper and could not be 
considered, explaining: 
24 On pages 43 and 48 of Appellant's Brief, Hoagland improperly bases her appellate arguments 
before this Court on unadmitted telephone audio recordings specifically, along with her 
arguments, stricken by the District Court. R. p. 3493. On page 8 of Appellant's Brief, Hoagland 
improperly bases her arguments to this Court on a portion of Dr. White's opinion specifically 
stricken by the District Court. R. pp. 3491, 3492. 
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Ball's affidavit is not based upon personal knowledge as required by Rule 56(e). 
The only evidence offered through the Ball affidavit is worker's compensation 
records from Market TransportlUnited Express attached as exhibits to the 
affidavit. Nothing in Ball's affidavit establishes that Ball has any personal 
knowledge of either the accidents discussed in the records or the preparation and 
maintenance of the records themselves. Because the affidavit fails to establish 
that Ball is competent to testify as to the matters contained therein, this Court will 
not consider the contents of the affidavit in opposition to Albertson's affidavit. 
Cates argues that, because nothing in the record indicates that the records are not 
accurate and kept in the ordinary course of business, the exhibits to Ball's 
affidavit are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
This contention misstates the requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(e). It is Cates' burden 
to affirmatively show that Ball is competent to testify to the matters contained in 
the affidavit and that the affidavit is based on Ball's personal knowledge. Because 
the Ball affidavit fails to affirmatively establish that Ball has personal knowledge 
of the contents of the records offered through that affidavit or that the affidavit 
sets forth facts that would be admissible at trial, the contents of and exhibits to 
that affidavit will not be considered in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Id. at 1034, 895 P. 2d at 1227. 
In oral argument on the Defendants' first Motion to Strike, Hoagland's attorney argued to 
the District Court that anything produced in discovery is admissible for summary jUdgment 
purposes arguing: "All I knew is they produced discovery. And under the standard on summary 
judgment, if they produce it to me, I'm entitled to say that's been verified, that's authentic, and 
use that in summary judgment." Tr. 7/8110 Hearing (79:12-16). 
Hoagland's argument that anything produced to her in discovery and attached to the 
"Overson Affidavits" is admitted is inconsistent with LR.C.P. 56(e) and Cates. Before evidence 
can be admitted and considered by the court, proper foundation must be supplied by a witness 
with personal knowledge competent to testify to the contents. It is Hoagland's burden to supply 
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proper foundation for her exhibits. The Defendants ask this Court to hold that Hoagland's failure 
should have resulted in her evidence being stricken from consideration by the District Court. 
4. Motions to Strike. 
a. Motion to Strike #1. 
On July 1, 2010, Defendants filed their first Objection and Motion to Strike in response 
to an Overson Affidavit. R. pp. 914-932. The concern surrounded submissions supporting 
Hoagland's fifty-five (55) page Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed June 23,2010 (R. pp. 818-875), and found in Hoagland's 482 page 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed June 21, 2010 CR. pp. 288-763). 
Because Hoagland abandoned her original Complaint rather than defending it against 
summary judgment, the Overson Affidavit and Motion to Strike the 482-page affidavit was left 
in a legal limbo. The District Court did not rule specifically on each objection; instead deciding 
the Motion to Strike was denied "only to the extent evidence contained therein was admissible." 
August 16,2010 Amended Order; Tr. 7/8/10 (94:8-14). Because Hoagland's Appellate Brief 
continues to cite to this Overson Affidavit, and due to the District Court's lack of specific 
evidentiary rulings regarding the Affidavit, the Defendants unfortunately must reassert their 
same objections to Hoagland's continued lack of foundation. 25 The Defendants object to this 
25 The Defendants object to evidence where opposing counsel fails to set out his qualifications to 
testify to the existence, non-existence, or contents of records (e.g. R. pp. 290, 291, ~~ 17, 21, 24, 
28,35, and 38) and his ability to lay foundation for documents, his failure to set out how each is 
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Overson Affidavit as it fails to provide foundation for the attached Munroe 2001 psychiatric 
records, Munroe 2002 emergency room visit records, a 2002 psychiatric evaluation,26 a hard 
copy of an on-line F.D.A. brochure regarding the prescription drug Celexa27 (R. pp. 609-630), 
Boise City Police reports (R. pp. 640-651), and Saint Alphonsus emergency room records (R. pp. 
652-661). The Defendants appeal the District Court's determination not to strike this evidence 
and also move this Court not to consider the same as a basis for this appeal. 
b. Motion to Strike #2. 
The Defendants filed their second Motion to Strike (R. pp. 2246-2253) in response to 
Hoagland's Affidavit in Support of her Opposition to Defendants' Restated Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. pp. 2046-2072. This Motion to Strike was targeted at portions of the nearly three-
inch thick collection of documents appended to another Overson Affidavit. R. pp. 2073-2079, p. 
3851, Ex. 2). 
Hoagland based portions of her arguments on attached responses including letters from 
the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare (NCCHC), which were objected to and 
argued to the Court on December 9th and 10t \ 2010. R. pp. 2246-2253. The subject NCCHC 
letters (R. pp. 2228-2237) appear to have been shared with Overson, but he cannot lay 
foundation, since he was the neither sender nor the recipient of the documents. Further, the 
admissible at trial and how he is competent to testify to the matters contained therein. (R. pp. 
539-542, Ex. 11.) 
26 9 R. p. 91 . 
27 The District Court allowed the Celexa information over the Defendants' arguments. Tr. 7/8/1 0 
Hearing (39-40, 79-82, 94). 
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Overson Affidavit cannot lay foundation for the Jail and Court Services Bureau Standard 
Operating Procedures manuals. R. pp. 382-451,452-517. 
The District Court considered the Defendants' Second Motion to Strike, finding 
Hoagland failed to provide foundation for Ada County Detective Buie's report, that Overson's 
narration of a video was improper, and Overson's testimony regarding records was not 
inadmissible. However, the Court did not address the remainder of the objections. R. p. 2317. 
c. Motion to Strike #3. 
i. Dr. White's New Opinion and Exhibits. 
In support of her February 2011 Motion for Reconsideration, Hoagland filed another 
Overson Affidavit (R. pp. 2625-2990) and an Affidavit and Supplemental Report of Dr. Thomas 
White CR. pp. 3012-3030). Hoagland based her Motion for Reconsideration partially upon her 
new Overson Affidavit and partly on newly proffered opinions found in White's Supplemental 
Report, both of which the Defendants objected to and moved to strike pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e) 
and 12(f) and applicable case law. R. pp. 3250-3262. Ruling on the motions, the District Court 
allowed Exhibits 11, 13, and 14. R. pp. 3486-3504. The District Court also allowed the bulk of 
Dr. White's new opinion, determining that the Defendants should have filed an LR.C.P. 56(f) 
Motion to Continue the hearing rather than objecting to the inclusion. The District Court did 
strike Dr. White's legal conclusions about deliberate indifference. R. pp. 3491-3492. 
The Defendants appeal the District Court's determination to allow the remainder of Dr. 
White's report and explain the basis of their objections below. 
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ii. Dr. White's Supplemental Report Was Untimely. 
Dr. Thomas White is a retired prison psychologist hired to testify for Hoagland. His 
report, produced pursuant to the Court's scheduling order and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, consisted of 13 pages dated October 11, 2010. 
Preparing for trial, the Defendants traveled to Overland Park, Kansas and on November 
18, 2010, deposed Dr. White. During the deposition, the Defendants asked Dr. White what 
"opinions he reached in this matter." He responded that he would testify about staff members at 
the facility, Munroe's assessment and his judgment about the case. R. p. 3226 (6: 19-7: 1-12). He 
was asked, "Were there any more opinions or did that kind of encapsulate everything?" Dr. 
White answered, "That's kind of an umbrella notion ... but that's generally it, yes." And, to 
make sure, "Were there any other opinions or did we get everything probably in there?" Dr. 
White responded, "No, I think that was it." R. p. 3226 (7:16-21). 
Near the end of January 2011, Hoagland filed a new 14-page Supplemental Report from 
Dr. White. In the new report, White explained he lacked deposition transcripts of the Defendants 
and other witnesses when he authored his original Report. R. pp. 3016-3030. But, this was not 
the fault of the Defendants' scheduling. 
The Defendants objected and moved to strike Dr. White's Supplemental Report, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 12(f) and 26(b)(4), due process, and the trial Court's Scheduling Order. 28 See City of 
McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006). 
28 By waiting until the Defendants conducted Dr. White's deposition, after the Court's Restated 
Summary Judgment ruling, Hoagland gained a clear and unfair advantage - the Defendants were 
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The District Court did strike a portion of Dr. White's new OpIniOnS where he 
inappropriately opined as to application of the legal standard in this action.29 R. pp. 3491-3492. 
Defendants' appeal the District Court's determination that the new decision was an allowable 
supplement to White's earlier opinion. 
d. Motion to Strike #4. 
The Defendants filed their fourth Motion to Strike on March 4, 2011. R. pp. 3315-3325. 
The basis of the objection was Hoagland's argument in District Court briefing (R. pp. 3244-
3245) containing her counsel's psychiatric diagnoses divined from the "sound" of Munroe's 
voice on non-admitted Jail telephone audio recordings,30 stricken by the District Court. R. pp. 
3244-3245. 
The Defendants also objected and moved to strike Hoagland's mischaracterizations of 
Deputy Wroblewski's interaction with Munroe. R. pp. 3315-3325. Both on appeal and below, 
Hoagland's rendition of the facts could be misleading because of her omission of important facts. 
R. p. 3244. In her Appellant's Brief (pp. 5, 11, 15, 16,29, 30, 32,47,48), Hoagland focuses on 
the interaction between booking Deputy Wroblewski and Munroe when Munroe was booked the 
morning of September 29, 2008. Wroblewski was present as social worker James Johnson 
interviewed Munroe, then less than 30 minutes later, Wroblewski finished booking Munroe. The 
prejudiced since they were precluded from deposing Dr. White about his new opinions, and he 
could tailor his new opinion to the District Court's Order. 
29 Hoagland now argues the same to this Court, improperly citing to this stricken portion of Dr. 
White's opinion. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. 
30 Hoagland improperly argues to this Court based upon this same stricken evidence in her 
Appellant's Brief at pages 47 and 48. 
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important portion of the interaction is Mumoe explaining he was suicidal when he came in the 
night before, but was no longer suicidal. Wroblewski marked that Mumoe was suicidal (the 
night before), but he could not recall if there was an explanation ,area to explain Mumoe's 
comments that he was suicidal when he was brought to the Jail, but no longer. R. p. 3296 
(63:25-64:17). Wroblewski explained this repeatedly (See R. pp. 3289 (35:12-21), 3291 (42:23-
43:1),3296 (63:20-21), 3298 (72:1-2), 3300 (79:22-24), but Hoagland continually omits that 
portion of Wroblewski's testimony. Hoagland's assertions change the context and conversation 
between Wroblewski and Mumoe significantly, and should have been stricken below. 
The Defendants also called the District Court's attention to Hoagland's assertion below 
(R. p. 3244) and now on appeal (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4, 32,47,48) that when booked, Mumoe 
stated he heard voices and saw "shadow people." Again, Hoagland fails to include that in 
Mumoe's telephone call earlier the same morning, he stated that the only drug he wanted was 
Thorazine, and he would tell them "he heard voices" so that he could get it. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 
(Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 12). 
The District Court allowed both of Hoagland's mischaracterizations to remain, stating 
"that due to the amorphous nature of the motion, the Court is unable to address it with 
specificity." R. p. 3493. The Defendants ask this Court to overturn the District Court's decision 
not to strike Hoagland's partial assertions describing Wroblewski's interactions with Mumoe. 
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F. Are the Defendants Entitled to Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal? 
Should the Defendants prevail on cross-appeal, they request costs and attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, and/or Idaho Appellate Rule 41. The basis for an 
award of costs and attorney fees on cross-appeal is already set forth in the contemporaneously 
filed Respondents' Brief at pp. 74-75 and in the interest of efficiency will not be repeated, but 
instead incorporated by reference. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Defendants have cross-appealed a number of rulings by the District Court. While 
many of the cross-appeal issues will be rendered moot if this Court upholds the District Court's 
dismissal of Hoagland's lawsuit, other issues, if decided, will lend important guidance to 
governmental defendants and district courts. For instance, nationwide § 1983 law (save for the 
Ninth Circuit for the time-being) provides no cause of action for parents suing on behalf of an 
adult child. It would be helpful for this Court to decide that Idaho law is consistent with the rest 
of the nation. 
Secondly, protection from discovery and early determination on summary judgment is the 
very backbone of immunity. The Defendants moved for both, but were denied. Defendants ask 
this Court to instruct district courts to follow the teachings of the U.S. Supreme Court on this 
issue. 
In Idaho, unless a governmental employee acts beyond the course and scope of his job, 
his or her employer must defend and indemnify him or her. Since the Defendant won't be 
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personally liable for punitive damages, Plaintiffs should be precluded from asking for the same 
in a § 1983 action. 
Lastly, the Defendants request this Court overturn the District Court's refusal to award 
attorneys fees to the Defendants, and that the noted evidence submitted by Hoagland be stricken. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of March 2012. 
GREG H. BOWER 
By: 
s K. DIckinson 
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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